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This article provides a neurobiological account of symptoms that have been called ‘hysterical’, ‘psychogenic’ or ‘medically
unexplained’, which we will call functional motor and sensory symptoms. We use a neurobiologically informed model of
hierarchical Bayesian inference in the brain to explain functional motor and sensory symptoms in terms of perception and
action arising from inference based on prior beliefs and sensory information. This explanation exploits the key balance between
prior beliefs and sensory evidence that is mediated by (body focused) attention, symptom expectations, physical and emotional
experiences and beliefs about illness. Crucially, this furnishes an explanation at three different levels: (i) underlying neuromo-
dulatory (synaptic) mechanisms; (ii) cognitive and experiential processes (attention and attribution of agency); and (iii) formal
computations that underlie perceptual inference (representation of uncertainty or precision). Our explanation involves primary
and secondary failures of inference; the primary failure is the (autonomous) emergence of a percept or belief that is held with
undue certainty (precision) following top-down attentional modulation of synaptic gain. This belief can constitute a sensory
percept (or its absence) or induce movement (or its absence). The secondary failure of inference is when the ensuing percept
(and any somatosensory consequences) is falsely inferred to be a symptom to explain why its content was not predicted by the
source of attentional modulation. This account accommodates several fundamental observations about functional motor and
sensory symptoms, including: (i) their induction and maintenance by attention; (ii) their modification by expectation, prior
experience and cultural beliefs and (iii) their involuntary and symptomatic nature.
Keywords: attention; sensorimotor information processing; cognitive neuroscience
Abbreviation: FMSS = functional motor and sensory symptoms
Introduction
For thousands of years, a core pursuit of medical science has been
the careful observation of physical symptoms and signs. Through
these observations, supplemented more recently by investigative
techniques, an understanding of how symptoms and signs are
generated by disease has developed. However, there is a group
of patients with symptoms and signs that, from the earliest med-
ical records to the present day, elude a diagnosis with a typical
‘organic’ disease. This is not simply because of an absence of
pathology after sufficient investigation, rather that symptoms
themselves are inconsistent with those occurring in typical disease.
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In times past, these symptoms were said to be ‘hysterical’, a term
now replaced by the less pejorative but no more enlightening
labels: ‘medically unexplained’, ‘psychogenic’, ‘conversion’, ‘non-
organic’ and ‘functional’.
There are numerous historical examples of patients identified
as having hysteria who would now be diagnosed with an or-
ganic medical disorder. Some have assumed that this process of
salvaging patients from (mis)diagnosis with hysteria would con-
tinue inexorably until a ‘proper’ medical diagnosis was achieved.
Slater (1965), in his influential paper on the topic, described the
diagnosis of hysteria as ‘a disguise for ignorance and a fertile
source of clinical error’. In other words, with increasing medical
knowledge, all patients would be rescued from a diagnostic
category that did little more than assert that they were ‘too
difficult’.
This has not come to pass (Stone et al., 2005). Recent epi-
demiological work has demonstrated that neurologists continue
to diagnose a ‘non-organic’ disorder in 16% of their patients,
making this the second most common diagnosis of neurological
outpatients (Stone et al., 2010a). In contrast to Slater’s study
(1965), long-term follow-up of such patients shows that they
only rarely receive an alternative ‘organic’ diagnosis for their
symptoms (0.4% of a cohort of 1030 patients in the largest
such study; Stone et al., 2009a). Patients with these symptoms
are disabled and generate major costs to health and social services,
with UK estimates for annual costs associated with working-age
patients with ‘medically unexplained symptoms’ of around £18
billion (Bermingham et al., 2010), slightly more than the cost
associated with dementia for patients of all ages in the UK
(Knapp et al., 2007). But despite the common occurrence of
these symptoms, their associated disability, impact on quality of
life and cost to health and social care systems, they remain with-
out clear explanation.
Here, we propose a neurobiological framework to explain the
pathophysiology of (the subset of) sensory and motor symptoms,
which comprise the absence of normal or presence of abnormal
sensations or movements. Examples include: anaesthesia, blind-
ness, deafness, pain, sensorimotor aspects of fatigue, weakness,
aphonia, abnormal gait, tremor, dystonia and seizures. We choose
the term ‘functional motor and sensory symptoms’ (FMSS) be-
cause the term ‘functional’ is accommodating in its theoretical
implications and is rated by patients as inoffensive compared
with other terms (Stone et al., 2002).
Within FMSS we do not include functional symptoms involving
autonomic dysfunction and/or arousal, which may undergo
psychological elaboration (such as diarrhoea, constipation and
bloating in irritable bowel syndrome, palpitations in cardiac neur-
osis, etc.). Neither do we cover normal sensations that are
misinterpreted as evidence of serious illness, as occurs in hypo-
chondriasis, normal bodily appearances which are felt to be ugly,
as in body dysmorphic disorder, nor dissociative amnesia, stupor
or fugue. The FMSS we refer to comprise sensations and move-
ments, as it is the genesis of these abnormal phenomena that we
seek to explain. That said, our framework may be relevant to
understanding aspects of many of the disorders we have
excluded.
A unified theory for functional
motor and sensory symptoms
Our premise is that all FMSS are created by attentional and
belief-driven processes. These processes might involve subcortical
affective factors in many patients, but we believe such factors are
not always necessary and are certainly not sufficient to produce
FMSS. Below, we explain how a hierarchical Bayesian formulation
of brain function can account for the generation of FMSS by at-
tentional and belief-driven processes, and how such processes—
operating within the normal functional anatomy of perception and
voluntary movement—might generate symptoms that are inter-
preted by patients as involuntary and unwilled.
The hierarchical Bayesian formulation
of brain function
To understand the failures of perceptual inference that may under-
pin FMSS, it is necessary to consider the precise neurobiological
mechanisms that underlie perception and attention. In turn, this
requires a formal understanding of these processes in computa-
tional terms. In what follows, we appeal to recent advances in
theoretical neurobiology that link perceptual inference, at the rep-
resentational level, to functional anatomy and synaptic processes.
Given the extensive evidence for a hierarchical structure in the
brain (Felleman and van Essen, 1991), it is reasonable to suggest
that any generative model of the brain will also have hierarchical
structure where the outputs of one level provide inputs to the
next. Our neurobiological explanation for FMSS rests on hierarch-
ical Bayesian models of the brain underwritten by a theory of
nervous system function called the ‘free-energy principle’
(Friston et al., 2006, 2010; Feldman and Friston, 2010). The
free-energy principle asserts that any adaptive change made by
a biological system or organism must minimize its long-term aver-
age surprise. Surprise in this context means unexpected (i.e. un-
predicted) sensations. Because the long-term average of surprise
corresponds to the entropy (dispersion) of sensations, a failure to
minimize surprise would lead to a progressive increase in entropy
(sensory disorder) and violate the principles of self-organization
and homoeostasis that are characteristic of biological systems.
Organisms can minimize their sensory surprise by constructing a
hierarchical model of how sensations (exteroceptive, interoceptive
and proprioceptive) are caused. Sensory surprise can then be mini-
mized by reducing prediction errors, based on the predictions of
the model; either by changing sensory samples through action or
by changing the predictions through perception. In this frame-
work, perception corresponds to optimizing the model by chan-
ging synaptic activity and connection strengths to minimize
prediction errors. This is known as predictive coding in the com-
putational literature and the model is said to be generative
because it generates sensory predictions given probabilistic beliefs
about their causes.
In predictive coding, surprise or free energy is minimized at each
level of the cortical hierarchy by changing levels of activity in
neuronal populations encoding predictions and prediction errors,
namely prediction units and prediction error units. Prediction units
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represent the most likely causes of sensations (posterior expect-
ations or beliefs) and attempt to predict beliefs in the level below.
Prediction error units receive top-down predictions from the level
above and compare them to beliefs at that level; the discrepancy
between the prediction and the current belief at that level consti-
tutes a prediction error, which is projected back up to the predic-
tion unit in the level above. This forward projection drives the
prediction units to provide a better prediction and thereby sup-
press the prediction error it receives; minimizing prediction error is
the fundamental aim of the network. In doing so, prediction units
at all levels in the hierarchy come to represent the (hidden) causes
of sensory input at multiple levels of description. This surprise or
free energy minimization process—inferring the likely causes of
sensory data—is perception. Figure 1 gives a schematic summary
and further detail.
Why is this scheme ‘Bayesian’? Bayesian probability theory
evaluates the (posterior) probability of a hypothesis given prior
beliefs about its probability and the likelihood of relevant data.
The model is Bayesian because its hypotheses regarding the
causes of sensory input at any hierarchical level—i.e. its posterior
beliefs—are derived from both prior beliefs about the world and
current sensory evidence. In this context, (empirical) prior beliefs
about the world are conveyed by the (top-down) predictive
backward connections between hierarchical levels, and sensory
evidence by the (bottom-up) forward connections that pass pre-
diction errors up the hierarchy until they are ‘explained away’ by
changes in predictions. Empirical prior beliefs are associated with,
and unique to, hierarchical statistical models. In the present con-
text, this means that the posterior beliefs (expectations) at any
level of the hierarchy constitute prior beliefs (expectations) for
the level below. In short, by minimizing prediction errors or sur-
prise, the brain is trying to maximize the evidence for its genera-
tive model of the world.
Note that we use the terms ‘prior beliefs’, ‘expectations’ and
‘predictions’ interchangeably—‘beliefs’ in this sense are not neces-
sarily ‘beliefs’ in the sense that philosophers might use the term,
Figure 1 This figure provides a schematic overview of the message passing scheme usually presented as a neurobiologically plausible
implementation of predictive coding. In these schemes, neurons are divided into prediction (black) and prediction error (red) units that pass
messages to each other, within and between hierarchical levels in the cortex. Superficial pyramidal cells (red) send forward prediction
errors to deep pyramidal cells (black), which reciprocate with predictions that are conveyed by (polysynaptic) backward extrinsic con-
nections. These are functions of conditional expectations encoded by the activity of the prediction units. This process continues until the
amplitude of prediction error has been minimized and the predictions are optimized in a Bayesian sense. The prediction errors are the
(precision weighted) difference between conditional expectations encoded at any level and top down or lateral predictions. Note that
there are prediction errors at every level of the hierarchy. Crucially, the potency of prediction errors at any level of the hierarchy depends
upon their precision (blue arrows), which effectively modulates or weights the prediction error. The synaptic infrastructure proposed to
mediate this comparison and subsequent modulation is shown in the insert, in terms of a doubly innervated synapse that is gated by
dopamine (blue). Here, dopamine is delivered by en passant synaptic boutons and postsynaptic D1 receptors have been located on a
dendritic spine expressing asymmetric (excitatory) and symmetric (inhibitory) synaptic connections.
A Bayesian account of ‘hysteria’ Brain 2012: 135; 3495–3512 | 3497
i.e. consciously held and reportable propositions; they are prob-
abilistic representations (encoded by neuronal activity) in a hier-
archical Bayesian network, and their contribution to inference on
the causes of incoming sense data is the key issue, whether or not
one is conscious of their content. These beliefs or expectations can
range from the velocity of an object causing visual sensations to
the goals of another person whose behaviour is being witnessed.
We suggest that a common mechanism underlies the complete
range of FMSS, both motor and sensory, and it is therefore of
importance that the hierarchical Bayesian model we are discussing
can act as well as perceive (this is a pre´cis of arguments explored
in detail by Friston et al., 2010). In the motor system, as in all
systems, backward projections mediate predictions of sensory
input, in this case, proprioceptive input. The major difference be-
tween the perceptual and motor systems is that in the former the
only way to change prediction errors is to change predictions;
however, in the latter, predictions of sensory input can be ‘ful-
filled’ by movement; in other words, prediction errors can also be
altered by changing the signals that are predicted. Descending
projections from the motor system can therefore be regarded as
proprioceptive predictions that play the role of motor commands,
which, when compared with muscle spindle afferent signals at the
spinal level, generate sensory prediction errors that are resolved by
activation of motor neurons and movement. The key point here is
that movements can be induced by top-down prior expectation of
their sensory consequences, as the motor system automatically
moves sensory organs in order to fulfil proprioceptive predictions.
In other words, a movement is specified in terms of ‘what we
want to see [or feel], rather than what we want to do’ (Friston
et al., 2010).
Whether a movement will be emitted in response to top-down
predictions about the proprioceptive and exteroceptive conse-
quences of that movement clearly depends on the precision of
prediction errors at different levels in the sensorimotor hierarchy.
If the precision of high-level representations supervenes, then
proprioceptive prediction errors will be resolved through classical
reflex arcs and movement will ensue. However, if proprioceptive
precision is higher, then proprioceptive prediction errors may
well be resolved by changing top-down predictions to accom-
modate the fact that no movement is sensed. In short, not
only does precision determine the delicate balance between
sensory evidence and prior beliefs in perception, through exactly
the same mechanisms, it can also determine whether we act
or not.
How conflicting sensory data and prior
beliefs are combined: the role of
attention in modulating precision
A crucial question for us in considering the application of this
model to FMSS is: how are conflicting sensory evidence and
prior expectations resolved? If there is a discrepancy, which one
should win out? In predictive coding, prior beliefs and sensory
data are represented as probability distributions, with a mean
value (expectation) and a precision (inverse variance). Their preci-
sion determines the relative weights that they are given when
optimizing the posterior expectation—the brain’s final estimate
of the most likely cause—which is perceived. In the case of a
prediction error arising from the comparison of precise sensory
data and a relatively imprecise prior belief, the mean of the pos-
terior will be closer to the mean of the sensory data. Conversely,
with relatively imprecise sensory information, posterior beliefs will
be much closer to prior beliefs (Fig. 2).
The precision of sensory data (or prediction errors at any level of
the hierarchy) and prior beliefs are not fixed: they can be opti-
mized by attention to best reflect uncertainty about their contri-
bution. In neurobiological implementations of predictive coding,
the precision of prediction errors is encoded by the synaptic gain
Figure 2 A heuristic illustration of Bayesian inference in terms
of a likelihood distribution, a prior distribution and the resulting
posterior distribution. All these distributions are functions of
some hidden state or cause of observed data, where the likeli-
hood and prior distributions constitute a generative model. The
important issue to observe here is that as the precision
(certainty) of the prior increases, it draws the posterior estimate
towards it; and away from the likelihood distribution. Here,
precision corresponds to the inverse variance or dispersion
(width) of the distributions, indicated with the blue arrows.
Under models with additive Gaussian noise, the precision of
the likelihood corresponds to the inverse amplitude of the noise
(the signal-to-noise ratio).
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of the cells that encode them, the superficial pyramidal cells, in the
upper layers of the cortex (Mumford, 1992). Their gain or post-
synaptic responsiveness can be altered by several factors including
fast synchronous oscillatory activity and/or neuromodulators such
as acetylcholine and dopamine, both of which are implicated in
attentional mechanisms (Feldman and Friston, 2010). In short, the
potency of top-down prior beliefs in relation to bottom-up sensory
evidence is controlled by the relative precision of prediction errors
as each level of the cortical hierarchy. Neurobiologically, this pro-
foundly important control may be mediated by the classical mod-
ulatory neurotransmitter systems of the sort implicated in
Parkinson’s disease and schizophrenia.
The effect of changing the content and precision of prior beliefs
can be seen experimentally. For example, changing sensory ex-
pectations in healthy subjects affects both stimulus perception and
its electrophysiological correlates. Lorenz et al. (2005) gave sub-
jects painful laser stimuli that were preceded by cues predicting
how intense the pain would be. These cues were sometimes in-
accurate: a high intensity cue could be followed by a low intensity
stimulus. Subjects’ pain ratings were affected by the cues—pain
perception was biased towards the predicted outcome—as was
the amplitude of the magnetoencephalogram signal in contralat-
eral secondary somatosensory cortex. Altering expectations about
visual stimuli has also been shown to change the perceptual
threshold and associated electrophysiological responses (Melloni
et al., 2011). These expectations correspond to prior beliefs estab-
lished by the experimental context or task instructions about the
level or magnitude of some sensory attribute. Similar contextual
beliefs can also be induced about the precision or uncertainty of
an attribute (e.g. where a visual target might appear). This pro-
vides a formal account of the interaction between attention and
expectation, where attention optimizes the precision of various
processing channels given appropriate cues for expectations. For
example, the effect of attention on the time to respond to, and
EEG correlates of, stimulus presentation in the Posner task
(a pre-cued reaction time task) has successfully been modelled
with a hierarchical Bayesian network by Feldman and Friston
(2010), reproducing previous empirical findings with respect to
reaction times (Posner et al., 1978) and EEG signals (Mangun
and Hillyard, 1991).
For some like James (1890), attention means the (voluntary)
direction of consciousness. This Jamesian view describes the
top-down, conscious control of an attentional ‘spotlight’
(LaBerge, 1983) that optimizes synaptic gain where it is ‘dir-
ected’. In the Bayesian brain, attention means the process of
optimizing synaptic gain to represent the relative precisions of
prior expectations and sensory information during inference
(Feldman and Friston, 2010) and provides a formal basis for the
Jamesian view of attention. The optimization of synaptic gain by
attention can come about by (Jamesian) voluntary direction of
attention through top-down task-relevant cues or bottom-up
‘pop-out’ mechanisms that occur outside conscious control
(Hommel et al., 2001), and even in spite of it (Munoz and
Everling, 2004). Indeed, much of the theory behind free energy
minimization is based upon Helmholtz’s notion of unconscious
inference.
Functional motor and sensory
symptoms as a disorder of abnormal
expectations and misdirected attention
In our model of hierarchal Bayesian inference, we have empha-
sized how the interaction between the ‘nature and precision’
of prior expectations and the nature and precision of prediction
errors caused by sensory data generates what we perceive or
whether and how we move. In this scheme, the precision
(weight) attached to prediction errors is modulated by attention,
and the content of the eventual percept depends on the hierarch-
ical level and domain of that modulation (e.g. visual domain,
somatosensory domain).
Given this framework, we propose that the common abnormal-
ity that produces FMSS is the emergence of abnormal prior beliefs
that are afforded excessive precision by attention. Note that we
do not distinguish between a primary pathology in neuronal popu-
lations encoding prior beliefs that could misappropriate attention
or a primary pathology of attention that produces prior beliefs
held with undue conviction (precision). Both are plausible candi-
dates and both call on the pathology of neuromodulation at the
synaptic level.
The consequences of endowing beliefs about sensations or
movements with undue precision (certainty) are two-fold. First,
there will be false perceptual inference as top-down prior beliefs
overwhelm bottom-up sensory evidence from lower levels.
Second, higher levels now have to explain the emergence of the
belief, leading to a misattribution of agency in the sense that
top-down attentional processes induced the belief but did not
predict its content. In what follows, we deconstruct this broad
proposal, showing how aberrant priors and attentional misdirec-
tion might arise, how sensory and motor symptoms might be
generated and why these are not experienced as voluntary by
patients.
How pathological expectations and
attention might originate in patients
with functional motor and sensory
symptoms
There is a significant literature describing the importance of atten-
tion in the development and maintenance of somatic symptoms,
reviewed by Brown (2004) and Kirmayer and Taillefer (1997).
Patients with FMSS have a body-focused attentional bias
(Robbins and Kirmayer, 1991), and introspective people are
more likely to experience somatic symptoms (Pennebaker, 1982;
Hansell and Mechanic, 1986; Robbins and Kirmayer, 1986).
Directing attention towards the self tends to increase reports of
physical symptoms (Pennebaker and Brittingham, 1982), whether
during exercise (Pennebaker and Lightner, 1980; Fillingim and
Fine, 1986) or not (Schmidt et al., 1994).
Such work has led Brown (2004) to propose that ‘all somato-
form conditions with the exception of those involving observable
physical phenomena are governed by the same basic mechanism,
namely, the repetitive reallocation of high-level attention on to
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symptoms’. We agree with this proposal but suggest it should
encompass symptoms involving observable physical phenomena,
such as paralysis or tremor too, as (conscious) attention is clearly
very important for their maintenance. Patients with functional
tremor show changes in tremor frequency when asked to tap at
a different rhythm with another limb, even to the extent of com-
plete entrainment with the frequency of tapping (Schwingenschuh
et al., 2011). Likewise, if a patient with functional leg weakness
is asked to flex their unaffected hip, their unattended ‘paralysed’
hip will automatically extend; this is known as Hoover’s sign (Ziv
et al., 1998). Inconsistencies between clinical signs based on
muscle power or movement speed and performance of the same
movements in different (more implicit) contexts are also com-
monly seen. These features are all consistent with a need for
explicit attention towards the movement for impairment to mani-
fest, and a normalization of movement when attention is diverted.
These features are the reverse of those seen in patients with
organic neurological signs. In Parkinson’s disease, for example,
tremor worsens with distraction. It is much more difficult to
gauge whether distraction improves functional sensory symptoms
such as anaesthesia, because assessing the symptom—asking, ‘Can
you feel this?’—inevitably draws attention to it. Were precise clin-
ical assessment of sensory symptoms possible, we hypothesize that
they would improve with distraction.
Some FMSS are influenced by personal and cultural beliefs that
are at odds with the constraints of anatomy and physiology. One
example is of a ‘tubular’ visual field defect, where patients with a
functional loss of their central visual field report a defect of the
same diameter, whether it is mapped close to them or far away.
This defies the laws of optics, but may fit with (lay) beliefs about
the nature of vision. Other examples include the triggering of
symptoms by non-physiological manoeuvres (e.g. application of
a vibrating tuning fork to the limb) and memory abnormalities
(e.g. forgetting one’s name), which might be assumed to occur
in people with memory loss, but in fact are rare even in those with
severe dementia.
There are also disorders—thought by many to be wholly or at
least partly functional—on whose incidence there appear to be
strong cultural influences. One example is ‘whiplash injury’, a syn-
drome dominated by chronic neck pain after an apparently minor
rear-end traffic collision. The likelihood of developing this syn-
drome is highly culturally biased; it is much rarer in countries
where the concept of whiplash injury is not known (Ferrari
et al., 2001). Importantly, the expectation in population surveys
of the medical consequences of minor traffic accidents mirrors the
incidence of whiplash symptoms. In a related study of low back
pain after minor injury in Australia, a state-wide campaign to
change expectations regarding the consequences of such injury
led to a sustained and significant reduction in the incidence and
severity of chronic back pain (Buchbinder and Jolley, 2005).
Further evidence for the fundamental role of beliefs or expect-
ations in causing FMSS is a curative response to placebo. It is
important to differentiate such dramatic responses from the
minor to moderate benefits of placebo treatment commonly
seen in patients with organic disorders. Patients with functional
dystonia can obtain immediate and total resolution of their
muscle spasm following a botulinum toxin injection (Edwards
et al., 2011), despite the fact that botulinum toxin takes at least
24–48 h to relax muscles at the level of neuromuscular transmis-
sion. The active component of the treatment here is clearly the
patient’s expectation of success (in the CNS), rather than the
pharmacological action of the drug (in the PNS). Dramatic reso-
lution of symptoms following non-physiological interventions is
frequently reported in patients with FMSS, and provides the high-
est level of diagnostic certainty in some diagnostic classification
systems (Fahn and Williams, 1988; Gupta and Lang, 2009).
This evidence highlights the importance of attention and beliefs
about symptoms in the phenomenology of FMSS. This relationship
was noted at least as far back as the mid-19th century (Reynolds,
1869). Abnormal expectations about illness could be generated by
a mixture of factors highlighted in previous models of somatiza-
tion, such as physical illness in the patient him or herself (Stone
et al., 2009b), by exposure to illness in the family (Hotopf et al.,
1999) or while in a medical or paramedical job (Crimlisk et al.,
1998), over concern with children’s symptoms or reinforcement of
children’s illness behaviour (Benjamin and Eminson, 1992), health
scares in the media (Stewart, 1990) or within colleagues (Ismail
and Lewis, 2006) or myriad other socio-cultural means.
These predisposing factors might all lead to abnormal beliefs
about illness, and therefore could be both a source of increased
attention towards symptoms, and also an influence on the content
of inferences made about symptoms (e.g. that they are due to
illness and not ‘normal’ phenomena), but they alone do not pro-
vide an explanation for the development or phenomenology of
the particular FMSS that occurs. From where might the content
of the abnormal prior expectation arise?
We wish to highlight here the notion of physical precipitating
factors in the generation of FMSS, something highlighted by
others, for example Reynolds (1869). It is notable that a physical
precipitating event is commonly reported close to the onset of
FMSS; and we believe that this provides an important explanation
as to why particular FMSS develop. For example, viral infections
commonly precede chronic fatigue syndrome or neurasthenia
(Wessely et al., 1998), somatic symptoms associated with panic
attacks are commonly reported prior to onset of non-epileptic
seizures (Rusch et al., 2001) and physical injury to a limb (causing
pain and immobilization) is commonly reported at the onset of
fixed abnormal limb postures or limb paralysis (Schrag et al.,
2004; Stone et al., 2009b, 2012a).
We suggest that salient sensory data arising from these preci-
pitating events are afforded excessive precision (weight), and that
this instantiates an abnormal prior belief at an intermediate level in
the cortical hierarchy trying to explain or predict those sensa-
tions—and that abnormal belief or expectation is rendered resist-
ant to extinction through the unusually high levels of precision
(synaptic gain) enjoyed during its formation. For example, for sen-
sory data from a triggering event signalling pain, the abnormal
prior belief may reside in the insular cortex, an intermediate-level
cortical level relevant to pain perception (Wiech et al., 2008). The
excessive precision afforded to the novel sensory data could have
a variety of causes in addition to the predisposing factors men-
tioned above, which include affective and cognitive biases and
their interactions. Negative effects such as anxiety and depression
themselves cause somatic symptoms, as well as increasing
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self-focused attention (Kolk et al., 2003) both through general
arousal (Wegner and Giuliano, 1980) and ruminations (Vassend,
1989). In healthy subjects, Berna et al. (2010) demonstrated that
inducing sadness increased the unpleasantness of painful stimuli
with those experiencing the greatest unpleasantness showing the
highest activations in the amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus.
Negative affect is very common in patients with personality dis-
orders, who in turn are at a higher risk of developing FMSS (Binzer
et al., 1997; Crimlisk et al., 1998). It has also been proposed that
somatically focused attention occurs in the setting of traumatic
events in order to avoid a potentially overwhelming affect
(Brown, 2004). Indeed, patients with non-epileptic seizures—
which have been associated in some patients with childhood
sexual abuse (Sharpe and Faye, 2006)—commonly report somatic
symptoms associated with panic attacks (palpitations, sweating,
hyperventilation) at the onset of attacks, but fail to report asso-
ciated affective symptoms (panic without panic). This process
could produce physical symptoms that the patient interprets as
being due to physical illness as he or she is not aware of the
affective content of the panic episode. Somatic symptoms of
panic occurring in conjunction with a physical trigger such as
injury are also reported in patients who go on to develop func-
tional weakness (Stone et al., 2012a). This might be an important
mechanism that adds additional physical symptoms and arousal to
a physical precipitant such as an injury, increasing the salience of
the resultant sensory data and facilitating the formation and re-
tention of an abnormal prior belief. A predisposition to learning, in
the context of salient information, is due to the fact that precision
in Bayes optimal schemes plays the role of a ‘learning rate’ in
classical reinforcement learning schemes. This means a high level
of precision promotes fast associative learning.
Cognitive biases might also be important for the way in which
sensory information from a physical triggering event is weighted
during perceptual inference. Patients with somatization disorder
have been shown to have cognitive biases towards retaining in-
formation relating to illness (Martin et al., 2007) and catastrophic
thinking about symptoms (Crombez et al., 1998). The ‘jumping to
conclusions’ bias is a well-known tendency of patients with delu-
sions, illustrated by their deciding after fewer draws than most
control subjects whether a hidden urn contains a majority of one
ball colour or another (Garety and Freeman, 1999). The Bayesian
perspective provides a unifying account of these failures to repre-
sent uncertainty and the key role of attention—this is because
both rest on optimizing the precision in hierarchical models. We
have recently demonstrated that the ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias
is also present in patients with functional motor symptoms, con-
sistent with a tendency to overweigh evidence; a tendency that
could lead to abnormal inferences about sensations during a phys-
ical triggering event (Paree´s et al., 2012a).
This discussion demonstrates the rich and varied potential causa-
tive factors behind the development of FMSS, which contrasts
with the simplistic concept of them being caused by a single
emotional traumatic event (e.g. childhood sexual abuse).
Epidemiological studies have not found childhood trauma, or
recent emotional life events, to be necessary for FMSS (Roelofs
et al., 2002; Sharpe and Faye, 2006; Kranick et al., 2011); indeed,
Sharpe and Faye (2006) comment, ‘the association with
psychological issues is much less prominent than expected’. The
emphasis on emotional triggering events, particularly childhood
sexual abuse, is, arguably, based on a specific (and perhaps sim-
plistic) interpretation of the concept of conversion disorder intro-
duced by Breuer and Freud in 1893–95 (Breuer and Freud, 1991)
and later extended by Freud alone. In this theory, the role of a
psychological conflict is paramount. Freud believed that a psycho-
logically challenging situation, replete with emotional conflicts,
could reawaken memories of an earlier (childhood) situation con-
taining similar, unresolved conflicts between biological drives and
social demands or childhood experiences. These (unconscious)
memories would give rise to unpleasant thoughts or emotions,
which were repressed in order to keep them from awareness
and hence from causing further distress or conscious recollection.
The ‘psychic energy’ of the repressed negative memories had to
find another method of discharging itself—so it was converted
into a somatic symptom, which generally had some symbolic re-
lation to the memories or wishes being repressed. This protection
of consciousness from conflict and distress was the ‘primary gain’
of the production of hysterical symptoms, although Freud noted
the patient might then derive a ‘secondary gain’ from their ele-
vated status as an invalid. Although many of the constructs and
the symbolism proposed by Freud have been discarded, the idea
that FMSS are an unconsciously generated expression of (other-
wise uncommunicated) psychological conflict retains considerable
popularity. We suggest, however, that this provides a rather
one-dimensional approach to causation that may not be appropri-
ate for many patients with FMSS. Indeed, overemphasis of the
importance of childhood sexual abuse and other specific life
events in causing FMSS by treating physicians may directly harm
patients for whom these factors are unimportant.
How expectations and attention could
create perceptions de novo in patients
with functional motor and sensory
symptoms
Kirmayer and Taillefer’s (1997) model of somatization rests on
attentional capture by bodily sensations that ‘arise from everyday
physiological disturbances or common illness, such as viral infec-
tions, or from emotional arousal or major mood or anxiety dis-
orders’, after which ‘even mild sensations can become magnified
once attention is focused [upon them]’, and so even ‘neutral sen-
sations may be re-evaluated as uncomfortable and threatening’.
This account, in common with Briquet’s (1859) original description
of chronically affected polysymptomatic patients, rests upon the
misinterpretation (false inference) and magnification of existing
sensations, but does not address how such sensations could be
created de novo [a problem also identified by Brown (2004)].
Though we have highlighted the presence of physical triggering
events above, which could provide such sensory information in
many patients with FMSS, there are those who do not report
such events, and those whose symptoms seem far removed
from any possible physiological or illness-related trigger.
The hierarchical Bayesian model provides a straightforward
solution to this problem, by showing that there might only be a
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quantitative—not qualitative—difference between ‘somatic ampli-
fication’ and the generation of completely false perceptions. No
sensory system is perfectly noiseless; even in the absence of stimuli
there will be random discharges of sensory receptors and neurons.
Given sensory data from other sources suggesting the absence of
a stimulus, or a prior expectation that no stimulus is present, this
noise will be explained as such by the predictive coding scheme
and will not be perceived. However, if a prior expectation regard-
ing the presence of a stimulus is sufficiently precise, random fluc-
tuations become perceived as a stimulus; perception will then
reinforce the strength of the prior, exacerbating the problem.
The false percept would be a hallucination (Friston, 2005a). This
process has been studied experimentally. Pennebaker and Skelton
(1981) showed that giving healthy subjects expectations about a
somatic symptom (that a noise would change body temperature)
caused them selectively to monitor somatic information that was
consistent with the expectation and to disregard information that
was inconsistent. This was despite the fact that, objectively, body
temperature was simply undergoing physiological random fluctu-
ations around a mean point. In the somatic signal detection task
(Lloyd et al., 2008), a tactile stimulus was paired with a visual
stimulus (light), such that if the light alone was presented, the
tactile stimulus was sometimes perceived; the perception was cre-
ated de novo because of the increased anticipation of its presence.
The rate of false perception of the tactile stimulus has been cor-
related with a tendency towards reports of somatic symptoms in a
non-clinical population (Brown et al., 2010).
Functional sensory systems
Figure 3 shows that hierarchical inference might be implemented
to explain the production of functional sensory symptoms. We pro-
pose, through the mechanisms suggested above, the creation of an
abnormal prior belief (false inference) within a particular (sensory)
domain. We make no distinction in mechanism between functional
sensory loss and positive functional sensory phenomena such as pain
or paraesthesia, simply that the prior belief is different.
This formulation deviates from previous theories proposing a
loss of the normal ability to attend to a body part underlies func-
tional sensory loss. The concept of loss of attentional control
(dissociation) with regard to FMSS has its roots in Janet’s (1907)
model for generation of functional sensory symptoms. Here, in
individuals with a pathologically weak mental state, psychological
stressors were proposed to lead to a narrowing of attentional
focus and a resulting disregard of certain sensory input. This pro-
vided an explanation for hysterical sensory loss, a symptom that
both Janet and Charcot proposed was an essential feature of hys-
teria. The narrowing of attentional focus proposed by Janet was
also thought to prevent certain memories (for example those relat-
ing to physical sensations occurring in the traumatic event) from
being properly incorporated within episodic memory. This could
lead to the spontaneous and unconscious activation of these
memories (perhaps triggered by salient internal or external cues),
which, because of their dissociation from normal personal
memory, might be experienced as perceptions rather than recol-
lections. The attentional dysfunction proposed by Janet’s (1907)
theory has influenced more modern models of functional
symptoms, which have conceptualized dissociation as a normal
phenomenon that becomes disruptive in those with functional
symptoms. Thus in Hilgard’s (1977) neodissociation theory, dis-
sociation is a normal and adaptive mode of cognitive processing
that allows intentional activity to continue in an automatic,
non-attended fashion, while the attentional resources of the
executive ego are directed elsewhere. However, in hypnosis, for
example, patterns of automatic activity (e.g. inhibition of limb
movement) can be triggered unconsciously, and, if dissociated
from the executive ego, can operate outside voluntary control.
Kihlstrom (1992) has proposed that the same mechanisms of hyp-
notic symptom generation outlined by Hilgard (1977) contribute
to neurological FMSS. Inspired in part by these ideas and Norman
and Shallice’s (1986) theory of supervisory attentional systems,
Brown (2004) put forward a sophisticated model of FMSS
whose fundamental mechanism is the automatic (i) selection of
perceptual hypotheses or (ii) triggering of actions (or action inhib-
ition) by a primary attentional system that lies hierarchically below
the self-aware, voluntarily operated secondary attentional system.
A ‘horizontal dissociation’ between this conscious system and the
automatic, unconscious primary attentional system is proposed to
account for a subject’s loss of control of their perceptions or
actions.
However, whatever form the theory takes, there is an important
problem: how can one account for the need for (conscious) atten-
tion to maintain certain FMSS if one’s model proposes that symp-
toms result from a loss of attentional control? One would surely
predict that symptoms generated by a loss of attentional control
would get worse with distraction, not better. Brown (2004) pro-
poses one solution: that in the case of FMSS—like tremor—which
require (conscious) attention, ‘schemata (i.e. motor responses)
may be subject to repeated reactivation through the operation
of the SAS (the hierarchically higher, conscious secondary atten-
tional system)’. However, this seems incommensurate with the
idea that patients with FMSS are unable to control their cognition
or action because their secondary attentional system is dissociated
from their automatic primary attentional system.
The hierarchical Bayesian account is straightforward: an overly
precise expectation of ‘no sensation’ is not fundamentally different
to an overly precise expectation of ‘pain’; the pathologically ele-
vated precision of the expectation of ‘no sensation’ can override
any bottom-up (relatively imprecise nocioceptive) sensory data.
The strength of the Bayesian account over earlier dissociative
explanations of sensory loss is that the latter rely on a loss of
the ability to attend to a given part of the sensorium, despite
the evidence suggesting that many FMSS require attention for
their maintenance. If prior beliefs about sensory input include a
pathologically elevated precision, then attending to the part of the
sensorium in which they are expressed will change the synaptic
gain of prediction error units in order to represent this increased
precision of the priors, i.e. attention to the relevant body part
amplifies (if not causes) the symptom.
At this point, a sceptic might point out that the FMSS that
seem to require attention involve the presence of abnormal move-
ments or pain, not sensory loss. Therefore, the sceptic says, sen-
sory (and indeed motor) loss must involve a dissociative
mechanism, i.e. loss of attentional control. Our view, however,
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is that the co-occurrence of functional pain and sensory loss in the
same part of the same patient (e.g. the patients described by
Mailis-Gagnon et al., 2003) demands a simpler, unifying explan-
ation. This view is supported by Brown et al. (2010), who looked
at illusory perception in normal subjects who scored highly on the
SDQ-20 (Nijenhuis et al., 1996), a questionnaire that mainly
measures conversion/dissociation experiences (e.g. sensory and
motor losses). The experimenters asked subjects whether they
could detect a vibration stimulus presented at sensory threshold.
Subjects scoring highly on the SDQ-20 had a more liberal response
criterion, attributable not to greater sensitivity but to more false
alarms. This demonstrates that a group who are more likely to
experience losses of sensation (conversion/dissociation symptoms)
are also more likely to show the presence of abnormal sensations
Figure 3 Here we illustrate schematically our proposal with regard to generation of functional sensory symptoms. In healthy subjects, we
suggest that an intermediate hierarchical level involved in sensation (e.g. secondary sensory cortex) integrates bottom-up prediction error
related to incoming sensory data (red arrows) and top-down priors about the causes of sensory data (black arrows) in an optimal way.
Top: The interaction between the likelihood of sensory data and the prior beliefs over those data at this intermediate hierarchical level,
which results in a posterior distribution corresponding to the percept or posterior belief. By this simplification, we do not mean that the
percept occurs only at the intermediate level; in reality, its physical representations are likely to be distributed across several levels. The
x-axes of the graphs in the top panels denote ‘the amount of sensation’; from none to a maximum. In FMSS, we propose that an abnormal
prior belief related to sensation in the relevant domain (here illustrated as the insular cortex for pain and the secondary sensory cortex for
non-painful sensation) is afforded too much precision via misdirected attentional gain from higher hierarchical levels (thick blue arrow).
This increase in precision (synaptic gain) causes a shift in the posterior distribution towards the prior expectation, overwhelming the
influence of bottom-up prediction errors (dotted red arrow). This results in a percept that matches the prior beliefs encoded by the
intermediate level, which is impervious to bottom-up prediction errors. At the same time, a precise prediction error is returned to higher
levels to excite higher-level representations or explanations for the abnormal percept—again these pathologically boosted prediction errors
dominate over prediction errors at the higher level when competing to influence high-level beliefs. These beliefs may include perceptual
attributes—like agency. Note that we are not proposing that increased attention to secondary sensory cortex (SII; for example) per se
causes anaesthesia; the crucial factor is the pre-existence of an abnormal prior belief predicting anaesthesia, whose precision is then
increased by attention to that area. The existence of a different prior belief in secondary sensory cortex would lead to a different percept.
Forward connections conveying prediction error are in red, backward connections conveying predictions are in black and the descending
attentional modulatory connections are in blue. Superficial pyramidal cell populations encoding prediction error are shown as red triangles
while deep pyramidal cells encoding posterior expectations are depicted as black triangles. Acg = anterior cingulate; Ins = insula;
Prc = precuneus; SI = primary sensory cortex; SII = secondary sensory cortex.
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(false alarms): we would explain both as being due to aberrant
attentional bias towards prior expectations; and a consequent
signal detection failure due to a suboptimal representation of the
relative precision of sensory noise.
A related study by Horvath et al. (1980) looked at habituation
of the galvanic skin response to repeated loud tones in patients
with conversion symptoms, mostly involving sensory or motor
losses and excluding positive symptoms, such as pain, dystonia
and tremor. They showed that these patients exhibited less
habituation to tones (unrelated to arousal), and interpreted this
as evidence of a selective attention deficit, or loss of attentional
control. As we have already emphasized, however, symptoms such
as paralysis (and, we argue, sensory loss) require attention for their
maintenance. This may be why Janet (1907) found that his pa-
tients had such difficulty concentrating on other things. We would
reinterpret the data from Horvath et al. (1980) as further evidence
of an abnormal attentional bias towards prior expectations that
can both amplify and reduce sensory signals in different contexts.
The idea that abnormal ‘top-down’ influences on afferent infor-
mation might be important in generating functional symptoms is
also found in a previous neurobiological approach—that of Ludwig
(1972). Our theory recapitulates Ludwig’s in the sense that his
theory was based on corticofugal, top-down, connections that
could amplify or inhibit afferent sensory signals beyond the level
of primary sensory cortex, and also that attentional dysfunction is
key. There is a crucial difference between us though, Ludwig
proposed that ‘inhibition of afferent stimulation and attention
directed towards this source of afferent stimulation are mutually
incompatible’. In other words, although attention to a symptom
could amplify it in hypochondriasis, the loss of sensory function in
hysteria must involve ‘diversion of attention to non-symptom
related areas’. We propose the opposite: namely, symptoms
require attentional gain for their expression.
Functional motor systems
Our underlying assumption about functional motor symptoms is
that they are fundamentally similar to other FMSS, in that they
involve a pathology of precision (in this case, the synaptic gain of
prediction error units in coding the proprioceptive consequences of
movement), where, in the motor system, the attentional optimiza-
tion of precision can be cast in terms of affordances (i.e. action
possibilities).
Previous explanations for functional paralysis have proposed
that it might be due to an inhibition of willed movement
(Marshall et al., 1997), perhaps facilitated by dissociation from
the limb and mediated by a loss of attentional control over it. It
follows logically from this explanation that the pathophysiology of
functional paralysis would be different from that of positive func-
tional motor symptoms such as tremor or jerks that are clearly not
due to inhibition of movement and where the attentional contri-
bution towards the generation of symptoms is clinically obvious.
However, as with the distinction in previous theories between
functional sensory loss and functional pain phenomena, we believe
that there is no need for different theoretical explanations for
paralysis and positive functional motor symptoms. As with sensory
symptoms, these motor symptoms commonly co-occur, arguing
for a unified theoretical approach. Attention is also clearly import-
ant clinically for generation of functional weakness; distraction
often produces a normalization of symptoms. It is also essential
to note that flaccid complete paralysis is extremely rare in those
with functional paralysis (Stone et al., 2010b; J. Stone, personal
communication). Most patients instead have difficulty in generat-
ing movement of the required quality (power, direction or speed).
We would therefore propose that the only difference between
negative and positive functional motor symptoms is the content
of the abnormal prior beliefs about proprioception, and in what
way it specifies the scaling and dynamics of movement.
Where anatomically might abnormal prior beliefs related to (the
sensory consequences of) movement reside? We propose they
would be in intermediate-level motor areas, such as premotor
cortex or the supplementary motor area. There are several reasons
for this prediction. First, somatomotor representations of func-
tional motor symptoms would necessarily be complex, and—if
they originate within the normal sensorimotor hierarchy, which
this hypothesis contends they should—they therefore must be at
a sufficiently high level within the hierarchy, where movements
are coded in a more abstract form (e.g. in an intrinsic frame of
reference). Second, although somatomotor representations of
functional motor symptoms must be at a high level, they should
not be at a level associated with conscious intentions to move.
Numerous functional MRI experiments have shown intention-
related pre-supplementary motor area activations (Nachev et al.,
2005), increasing when subjects attend to their intention rather
than their movement (Lau et al., 2004), so one might conjecture
that pre-supplementary motor area has either normal or reduced
precision in patients with functional motor symptoms, relative to
other cortical areas encoding the movement per se.
Figure 4 provides a schematic illustration of the functional anat-
omy implied by this hypothesis. The key idea here is that an inter-
mediate representation of movement is afforded too much
precision, relative to higher (intentional) levels of the hierarchy.
The consequences of this pathologically high precision are that it
will induce autonomous activity (attractor dynamics or central pat-
tern generators) generating somatosensory and proprioceptive
predictions that elicit a movement by classical reflex arcs. This
rests on precise prediction errors, which entrain predictions that
are propagated down the hierarchy to the spinal cord or cranial
nerve nuclei. At the same time, overly precise prediction errors are
passed forward to higher levels, signalling movement that was not
predicted by higher hierarchical levels and, presumably, cause it to
be interpreted as a symptom. This scenario is consistent with
attentional exacerbation of a hierarchical imbalance in precision
and the dissociation between the representation of a symptom
(intermediate level) and the intentional context in which that
symptom is perceived (higher level). This explanation for FMSS
makes no fundamental distinction between functional motor
symptoms involving weakness and those involving involuntary
movements such as tremor; the movement produced simply
reflects the content of the abnormal prior recruited by attention-
dependent changes in precision (synaptic gain). It is notable that
prefrontal hyperactivation is a common finding across functional
MRI studies of sensorimotor FMSS, and that this is also the case
for hypnotically induced paralysis (Bell et al., 2011). While these
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activations are often interpreted as inhibiting motor or sensory
cortices (Broome, 2004), we suggest that they could instead
reflect attentional release of abnormal priors in lower hierarchical
tiers.
Functional imaging studies provide further data that can be re-
interpreted in the light of our hypothesis. In a recent study (Cojan
et al., 2009), a single patient with functional paralysis (versus 24
controls and six feigners of paralysis) underwent functional MRI
during a GO-NOGO task—encompassing preparation, execution
and inhibition of movement—which was performed with both the
affected and functioning hands. A contrast between all trial types
(preparation, execution and inhibition) in the affected (left) versus
unaffected (right) hands showed activations in the precuneus and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the patient, whereas in healthy
controls it showed right motor cortical activation and in feigners
activations in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and parietal areas. The
authors speculated whether ventromedial prefrontal cortex and
precuneus could ‘have a more direct role in the modulation of
motor activity’ in conversion, as previous authors have suggested
that ventromedial prefrontal cortex could inhibit the motor system
(Marshall et al., 1997; Halligan et al., 2000; Vuilleumier, 2005),
but they conclude that ventromedial prefrontal cortex ‘may not be
directly responsible for motor inhibition’ because it was not acti-
vated in any NOGO trials in controls, or the healthy hand in the
patient and feigners. Their ultimate conclusion was that in the
context of left sided motor conversion symptoms, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex and precuneus activations may imply ‘some in-
creases in self-monitoring processes that could control right motor
activity . . . based on internal representations and memories related
to the self’.
A reinterpretation of these data in the light of our model
(namely abnormally high synaptic gain mediated by attention)
yields a more specific conclusion. The region of ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex active in this study corresponds precisely to that
region proposed by Burgess et al. (2007) to allow sustained,
self-maintained attention to amplify higher sensory input and
strengthen its relationship to established behavioural routines.
We would therefore interpret its activation in conversion paralysis
as an indication of the subject’s attentional mediation (exacerba-
tion) of their abnormal symptom-related priors. Under our hypoth-
esis, we would expect a higher sensory area such as the precuneus
to be the site of strong prediction errors stemming from a
Figure 4 This schematic illustrates the hierarchical anatomy we presume underlies false inference in patients with functional motor
symptoms (both weakness and ‘positive’ phenomena such as tremor). In normal movement, we propose that predictions regarding the
sensory consequences of intended movement arise at a high hierarchical level (here pre-supplementary motor area) and are propagated
down the motor hierarchy, producing a proprioceptive prediction error (peripherally) that is fulfilled by movement. In functional motor
symptoms we propose that an abnormal prior expectation related to the dynamics/scaling of movement is formed within an intermediate
motor area (here the supplementary motor area). This prior is afforded abnormal precision by attentional processes (thick blue arrow) that
cause intermediate level motor predictions (thick black arrow) to elicit movement and prediction errors (thick red arrow) to report the
unpredicted content of that movement to higher cortical areas (here, pre-supplementary motor area). The secondary consequence of
these prediction errors is that prefrontal regions will try to explain them away in terms of a symptomatic interpretation or misattribution of
agency to external causes; in short, a failure to realize the movement was intended. Forward connections convey prediction error (red),
backward connections convey predictions (black) and descending attentional modulatory connections (blue). pSMA = pre-supplementary
motor area; M1 = primary motor cortex; SMA = supplementary motor area.
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mismatch between the actual and intended (i.e. predicted by
pre-supplementary motor area but not by lower motor levels) sen-
sory consequences of movement, hence its activation as a main
effect of paralysis is unsurprising.
Not all imaging studies of motor symptoms find evidence of
increased prediction errors (contrasting actual movement versus
intended movement) in higher parietal sensory areas. One excep-
tion is Voon et al. (2010a), who found lower activity in the right
temporoparietal junction in patients with conversion tremor, com-
pared with activations elicited when asked to stimulate their
tremor voluntarily. As the authors acknowledge, this finding
goes against numerous studies that demonstrate increased activity
around this area in conditions when movements feel involuntary,
in both normal subjects (Farrer and Frith, 2002; Blakemore and
Sirigu, 2003) and people with schizophrenia (Spence et al., 1997;
Schnell et al., 2008). The explanation for this anomaly may be the
decreased functional connectivity observed between the right
temporoparietal junction and sensorimotor areas in the conversion
tremor condition—if predictions do not reach the right temporo-
parietal junction, they cannot generate prediction errors.
If attending to motor expectations brings them about, then one
would expect that patients with functional tremor would think it
were there almost all of the time, because whenever they attend
to it, it is manifested (unlike organic tremors). We have recently
shown this to be the case using ambulatory tremor recordings of
patients with functional and organic tremor and comparing these
with self-completed diary ratings of tremor (Paree´s et al., 2012b).
All patients overestimated the duration of tremor they had but this
happened to a far greater degree in patients with functional
tremor, who had less than 30 min of tremor a day, but rated
tremor to be present at least 80% of the waking day. Patients
were fully aware of the purpose of the study, making malingering
an unlikely explanation for these results.
Expectations, attention and the
misattribution of agency: the problem
of voluntariness
The issue of what is voluntary about FMSS is one of the most
difficult questions to be addressed by any pathophysiological
theory. This issue is difficult because FMSS and feigned symptoms
have almost identical objective characteristics: Maruff and
Velakoulis (2000) showed that even the imagined movements of
a subject with functional paralysis had similar timing and duration
as those of subjects feigning paralysis (as did the actual move-
ments). Although functional brain imaging studies do show differ-
ent patterns of activation in feigners and patients with functional
motor symptoms, these studies are invariably underpowered and
the differences are hard to interpret (Spence et al., 2000; Stone
et al., 2007); in short, functional imaging is very far from being
able to stipulate criteria that distinguish FMSS from feigning.
While not entirely solving this difficult issue, we argue that our
model of FMSS, based as it is on expectations and attention, fun-
damentally alters the way in which one frames any question
regarding voluntariness of symptom generation in patients with
FMSS. Given this model, the question ‘Are these symptoms
voluntary or involuntary?’ can be reframed as two questions
which cast voluntariness in a different light: ‘How voluntary are
these expectations?’, and ‘How voluntary is the patient’s attention
to their symptoms?’
With regard to the formation of abnormal priors, we would
point to important parallels between abnormal prior expectations
we hypothesize to be at the root of FMSS, and very similar phe-
nomena that are thought to underlie delusional beliefs (Corlett
et al., 2009, 2010). One would not generally question a patient
with delusions about the voluntariness of their beliefs, and we
suggest that the same reasoning should apply to patients with
FMSS. We have discussed above the range of predisposing and
precipitating factors that might be relevant in patients with FMSS.
The influence of these factors hardly amounts to intentional cre-
ation of abnormal priors.
The situation with regard to volition and attention is more com-
plex, and, perhaps, truly gets to the heart of the problem of vol-
untariness in FMSS. First, we have described above how in
addition to a (conscious) allocation of attentional resources—the
Jamesian ‘attentional spotlight’—attention can be attracted onto
parts of the sensorium via contextual cues or ‘bottom-up’ mech-
anisms that act outside of, or even in spite of, conscious control.
This might be a mechanism whereby attentional misdirection to-
wards abnormal symptom-related priors can occur without inten-
tion in patients with FMSS, and provides an explanation for the
description of intrusive symptoms by some patients, for example
those with non-epileptic attacks, which can occur when the pa-
tient is relaxing and not consciously attending to anything in
particular.
Second, we wish to point out the normal phenomenon that
when attention is self-focused (for example towards the mech-
anics of movement rather than the goal of the movement), per-
formance is often impaired (Jueptner et al., 1997). This is a
common occurrence in situations accompanied by high perform-
ance anxiety, and is proposed as the mechanism behind ‘choking’
in professional sport (Beilock and Carr, 2001). Functional imaging
studies suggest recruitment of prefrontal areas when healthy sub-
jects are asked to concentrate on producing over learned move-
ments (Jueptner et al., 1997), something that produces
deterioration in task performance. It is hypothesized that the de-
terioration in performance caused by self-focus is due to recruit-
ment of slow, sequential, explicit processing that uses declarative
rules that are inadequate to control complex movement patterns
that are usually produced through implicit mechanisms (Haggard
et al., 1994). We suggest that this phenomenon could lie behind
the emergence of ‘blocking’ phenomena reported commonly by
patients with FMSS, for example a sudden transient inability to
move, speak or swallow, often occurring during examination or
other time of heightened attention to symptoms, also consistent
with some previous experimental findings in FMSS (Roelofs et al.,
2003, 2006). As with the occurrence of this phenomenon in
healthy people, one would not accuse patients with FMSS who
experience symptoms through this mechanism of deliberately pro-
ducing symptoms; in fact it is as if they are trying too hard to
perform normally.
However, as discussed in more detail above, we suggest that
the majority of symptoms are associated with the (conscious)
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direction of attention towards abnormal symptom-related prior
beliefs. This attentional focus limits the attentional resources
available to other tasks, and could explain common complaints
of poor concentration, memory and mental fatigue in patients
with FMSS. Although a patient might voluntarily attend to his or
her symptoms when they could have done otherwise, this is very
different from proposing that the symptoms themselves are vol-
untary. To what extent a patient might focus his attention on his
symptom expectations because of his illness beliefs, or because
they are troubling to him, or because he derives secondary gain
from his illness, is an interesting question, which doubtless has
different answers in every patient. However the critical question
is: if attentional allocation is voluntary, why do the resultant
symptoms not feel so? Our account proposes that FMSS arise
when the precision of abnormal intermediate-level prior beliefs is
enhanced by misdirected, self-focused attention; however, it is
important to realize that the top-down effect of attention only
changes the precision of these prior beliefs—it does not predict
their content. We can attend, for example, to a portion of the
visual field, without predicting what will appear in it. This way,
aberrant attentional biasing can ignite or maintain autonomous
neuronal activity encoding percepts or movements, without any
top-down predictions about the content or nature of the ensuing
percept. Clearly patients will have reportable experiences with
regard to their symptoms: ‘when I try to move my arm it
shakes/won’t move’, ‘the left side of my body is numb/painful’
and self-focused attention combined with these beliefs will tend
to enhance the precision of abnormal beliefs about sensations
and movement. However, the resulting percepts are not pre-
dicted because the top-down attentional effect only amplifies
their precision—it does not predict or explain away the beliefs
that are made more precise. This would be like having attention
drawn to some part of the sensorium with no idea (prediction)
about what attracted attention—any subsequent percepts would
have to be explained from scratch. In our framework, these
explanations become symptoms due to a failure of inference
by the patient—a failure to predict or recognize that they
caused the percept (prior belief) by endowing it with too much
precision. This failure can be seen as a rational attempt to
explain percepts generated at intermediate levels in sensorimotor
hierarchies that were enabled but not predicted by higher
hierarchical levels.
If patients with functional motor symptoms over-attend to the
sensory consequences of movement, relative to the motor plan-
ning that underwrites conscious intentions, one would expect that
their sense of intention for other movements might also be ab-
normal, where this tendency a trait-like phenomenon. We have
previously (Edwards et al., 2011) demonstrated this to be the
case, using the well-known paradigm for timing conscious inten-
tions first developed by Libet et al. (1983). We found that patients
with a functional tremor judged the timing of their intention to
move as occurring at the same time as their actual movement, in
contrast to the perception of intention occurring significantly
before actual movement in healthy subjects. In other words, pa-
tients with FMSS may misattribute agency in a post hoc fashion
and fail to exploit high-level posterior beliefs that they are the
agents of their own actions.
Influences from outside the
somatomotor network
In proposing the above, we are not saying that no other brain area
outside the normal somatomotor network can make a contribution
to functional motor symptoms. Our aim is to describe the final
common pathway for these activations, when they result in FMSS,
and to explain the universal importance of precision (synaptic gain
or sensitivity) and attention in this pathway. This can render a
cortical area population inappropriately sensitive to afferents
from many other systems and, indeed, increase the amplitude of
its efferents to other regions—in other words, lead to increased
connectivity with other regions. There is certainly evidence for
FMSS-related activations in the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortices
and posterior cingulate cortices. In a functional MRI study, Voon
et al. (2010b) looked for and found a greater functional connect-
ivity between the right amygdala and right supplementary motor
area in patients with functional motor symptoms when they were
exposed to stimuli of high emotional valence. Similarly, in a case
study of one patient with a right sided functional paralysis, Kanaan
et al. (2007) found that recall of an emotionally salient (but clin-
ically repressed) memory, when compared with recall of a similarly
emotional but unrepressed memory, was associated with activa-
tion of the amygdala, cingulate gyrus and premotor areas
(amongst others), and relative deactivation of left primary motor
cortex. In an earlier single photon emission computed tomography
study, Vuilleumier et al. (2001) found decreased activation of the
caudate nucleus and thalamus in patients with conversion sensori-
motor loss, which correlated with the duration of their symptoms.
They noted that both the caudate nucleus and thalamus receive
limbic projections (e.g. from the amygdala).
Predictions and conclusions
Predictions
The hierarchical Bayesian model we have used is grounded in the
fundamental mathematical and computational imperatives for
adaptive biological systems like the brain (Friston et al., 2006),
and also makes very specific predictions about both its functional
anatomy and the kinds of measurable responses it should generate
(Friston, 2005b; Garrido et al., 2009). Using this model, one can
make quantitative empirical predictions about how the encoding
of uncertainty or precision and attention can affect perception and
its neurophysiological correlates (Feldman and Friston, 2010),
which should mean we can generate testable predictions about
our model of FMSS.
The framework for FMSS proposed here posits a single mech-
anism for the generation of a wide variety of symptoms: if this is
correct, certain features can be expected to generalize from one
symptom type to another. Particularly important, in the context of
the framework proposed here, is the role of attention in symptom
generation. Attention is known to be important for the mainten-
ance of functional motor symptoms (Paree´s et al., 2012b), but its
role in the generation or perpetuation of sensory loss has not been
examined. Given the common causal mechanism for FMSS
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outlined above, we would expect attention to have an exacerbat-
ing effect on the severity of all FMSS, including sensory loss; given
the difficulty of using self-reports of sensation in patients with
anaesthesia, proxies such as sensory evoked potentials (Levy and
Mushin 1973; Kenntner-Mabiela et al., 2008) could be used in-
stead. In controls, attention has been shown to increase the mag-
nitude of somatosensory evoked potentials; we would expect
opposite responses in patients with functional sensory loss.
Patients with FMSS may be hard to differentiate from those
malingering symptoms and it is almost impossible to ascertain
with standard diagnostic techniques whether a functional symp-
tom is generated consciously or not. However, recent studies have
demonstrated differences in EEG responses to stimuli when they
are consciously perceived compared to when they are not
(Babiloni et al., 2006; Schubert et al., 2006). Investigating such
correlates of conscious perception might pave the way towards
more sophisticated diagnoses for patients with FMSS.
We have proposed that the fundamental pathology in FMSS is
the presence of overly precise priors at intermediate levels of the
hierarchy, which may lead to the overweighting of bottom-up
inputs that accord with those priors. Abnormalities of precision,
or uncertainty, in Bayesian processing in the brain have also
been proposed to underlie the overweighting of sensory data,
which is thought to lead to positive symptoms of schizophrenia
(Corlett et al., 2010). Based on this commonality in the proposed
causative mechanisms, we would predict that patients with FMSS
will perform better than normal subjects in a force-matching task
that measures the attenuation of proprioceptive prediction errors
in voluntary movement (Shergill et al., 2003). Schizophrenic sub-
jects also perform better than controls on this task (Shergill et al.,
2005), as they do in other illusory perception paradigms (Dakin
et al., 2005), because they are unable to generate predictions that
will suppress proprioceptive prediction errors; FMSS patients’ ab-
normal priors may lead to a similar overweighting of sensory data.
Conclusions
We have employed a Bayesian hierarchical model to explain
FMSS. Figure 5 provides a general schematic. In this formulation,
symptoms across the somatization-conversion spectrum can all be
understood as pathologically precise prior beliefs, mediated by
attentional processes, which result in perceptual and/or motor
symptoms (precise posterior beliefs) that are experienced by
the patient as involuntary. This unified approach to diverse
FMSS is consistent with the common co-occurrence of these
symptoms; patients with a diagnosis of somatization disorder
have, by definition, suffered from at least eight FMSS, and care-
ful history taking will reveal that many patients with conversion
disorder have suffered or are suffering from other FMSS (Stone
et al., 2010).
The picture that emerges here is of a primary problem
with the attentional control of synaptic gain at intermediate
(domain-specific) levels of sensorimotor hierarchies. Functionally,
when considered in the context of formal theories of hierarchical
neuronal computations, this abnormal gain control translates into
an abnormally high precision or conditional confidence in probabil-
istic representations at that level in the hierarchy. The primary
functional consequence of precise posterior beliefs is, in the sen-
sory domain, the presence (or absence) of a well formed percept.
If the cortical areas involve motor systems, then abnormally pre-
cise top-down predictions will elicit motor behaviour (or even its
absence) through classical motor reflex arcs. The resulting percepts
or motor phenomena become symptoms when the patient infers
them to be caused by some pathology or illness. This can be
regarded as a secondary false inference by higher levels that are
trying to explain percepts that they did not predict. The result is a
misattribution of agency, where experiences that are usually gen-
erated in a voluntary way are perceived as involuntary.
Despite the unusual and often severe nature of symptoms,
FMSS can be seen as an extreme instance of a common phe-
nomenon in predictive coding networks—the overweighting of
prior beliefs over sensory data—which underlies normal experi-
ences from optical illusions to placebo effects. Psychological
stressors including childhood adversity or recent stressful events
may well influence expectations and the deployment of atten-
tional modulation (or the content of secondary false inferences
about the causes of sensations), but this need not be the exclu-
sive route to the production of functional symptoms. We pro-
pose a flexible approach to causation, which neither dismisses
the relevance of traumatic events nor requires them to be pre-
sent in all patients.
We have highlighted how common and disabling FMSS are,
particularly in neurology practice, but there is an even wider rele-
vance for understanding the origin of and how best to treat these
symptoms. Most practising physicians would recognize that differ-
ent patients suffering from the same organic disorder of appar-
ently similar severity can experience vastly different levels of
symptoms and consequent disability. This phenomenon, often
known as functional overlay, is very common in neurology practice
(Stone et al., 2012b) and, we suggest, is often considered more of
an annoyance to the delivery of proper treatment for the organic
disorder rather than something of real significance in itself.
However, the model we have presented here—with its emphasis
on triggering by physical illness and injury, and a range of predis-
posing factors related to illness beliefs and personal experience of
illness—provides a principled explanation for the common
co-occurrence of functional and organic symptoms. These func-
tional symptoms may in many cases be more amenable to treat-
ment than the underlying neurological disease.
We close by acknowledging that this approach represents a
refinement and synthesis of ideas that have been developing
over centuries. The statistical framework upon which our model
is based and the theoretical underpinnings of active inference can
be traced back to the work by Bayes (1763) and Helmholtz
(1860), respectively. With regard to ‘hysteria’, it is sobering to
read Russell Reynold’s brilliant report of patients from the 1860s
(Reynolds, 1869) to appreciate that, while the neurobiological im-
plementation may have moved on, the fundamental approach we
are advocating may not be very different from a concept proposed
a century and a half ago. Despite the undoubted excesses and
some negative consequences, it is interesting that the explosion of
clinical and academic interest in hysteria in the latter part of the
19th century came at a time when neurology and psychiatry were
not seen as separate disciplines. The schism that developed in the
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20th century between neurology and psychiatry may be a major
reason for the subsequent lack of clinical and academic interest in
these patients, and the rather static nature of theoretical
approaches. The re-emergence of ‘functional’ disorders as a suit-
able topic for scientific study, in the past 15 years, parallels an ever
closer union between clinical and academic work in neurology and
psychiatry and allows a reappraisal of the subject with the benefit
of a century of neuroscientific progress, and a wealth of new
experimental techniques. More than a century since William
James wrote ‘Poor hysterics . . . first they were treated as victims
of sexual trouble . . . then of moral perversity and medioc-
rity . . . then of imagination’, and despite the frequency of this dis-
order and its impact on quality of life and healthcare economics,
scientific and therapeutic progress has been limited. The theoret-
ical approach to FMSS we have presented here provides a bio-
logically plausible model and testable experimental predictions
which, we hope, will aid hypothesis-driven pathophysiological
and therapeutic research in this area.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Dr Aikaterina Fotopoulou for very
helpful comments on the manuscript.
Funding
National Institute for Health Research Clinician Scientist Fellowship
(to M.J.E.) and Wellcome trust (to K.F. and R.A.A.).
References
Babiloni C, Vecchio F, Bultrini A, Luca Romani G, Rossini PM. Pre- and
poststimulus alpha rhythms are related to conscious visual perception:
a high-resolution EEG study. Cereb Cortex 2006; 16: 1690–700.
Bayes TR. An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of
chances. Philos Trans R Soc Lond 1763; 53: 370–418.
Figure 5 Here we provide a schematic that summarizes our theory. The 3D coloured plot represents an intermediate level within the
nervous system, e.g. secondary sensory cortex, supplementary motor area or insular cortex. The plot represents the probability over
different hidden states, arranged on a grid, where certain states are predicted to be more probable (peaks/red tones) and some are less
probable (troughs/blue tones). We propose that the primary problem is the formation of an abnormal prior at this level originally
instantiated via a number of interacting factors (not all of which are mentioned here and which will be different for different patients). The
formation of this abnormal prior belief (peak) is mediated by the misdirection of attention (illustrated by a self-directed attentional
‘spotlight’), which affords it abnormal precision. This changes the strength of the abnormal prior, so that it drives perception or action
consistent with it through top-down effects and calls for a higher-level explanation (e.g. agency) through bottom-up effects. Bottom:
When attention is diverted, the precision of the abnormal prior is reduced so that it no longer drives perception or action. A crucial point is
that the hierarchically higher sources of attention do not predict the precise dynamics of the percepts they induce. The resulting prediction
error is explained (rationally and within the cognitive/affective framework of the individual) as an involuntary symptom of illness.
A Bayesian account of ‘hysteria’ Brain 2012: 135; 3495–3512 | 3509
Beilock SL, Carr TH. On the fragility of skilled performance: what governs
choking under pressure? J Exp Psychol Gen 2001; 130: 701–25.
Bell V, Oakley DA, Halligan PW, Deeley Q. Dissociation in hysteria and
hypnosis: evidence from cognitive neuroscience. J Neurol Neurosurg
Psychiatry 2011; 82: 332–9.
Benjamin S, Eminson DM. Abnormal illness behaviour: childhood experi-
ences and long-term consequences. Int Rev Psychiatry 1992; 4: 55–69.
Bermingham SL, Cohen A, Hague J, Parsonage M. The cost of soma-
tisation among the working-age population in England for the year
2008/2009. Mental Health Fam Med 2010; 7: 71–84.
Berna C, Leknes S, Holmes EA, Edwards RR, Goodwin GM, Tracey I.
Induction of depressed mood disrupts emotion regulation neurocircui-
try and enhances pain unpleasantness. Biol Psychiatry 2010; 67:
1083–90.
Binzer M, Andersen PM, Kullgren G. Clinical characteristics of patients
with motor disability due to conversion disorder: a prospective control
group study. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 1997; 63: 83–8.
Blakemore SJ, Sirigu A. Action prediction in the cerebellum and in the
parietal lobe. Exp Brain Res 2003; 153: 239–45.
Breuer J, Freud S. Studies on hysteria. In: Strachey J, Strachey A, editors and
Translators. The Penguin Freud library, Vol. 3. London: Penguin; 1991.
Briquet P. Traite´ clinique et the´rapeutique de l’hyste´rie. Paris: J.-B.
Baillie`re et Fils; 1859.
Broome M. A neuroscience of hysteria? Curr Opin Psychiatry 2004; 17:
465–9.
Brown RJ. Psychological mechanisms of medically unexplained symp-
toms: an integrative conceptual model. Psychol Bull 2004; 130:
793–812.
Brown RJ, Brunt N, Poliakoff E, Lloyd DM. Illusory touch and tactile
perception in somatoform dissociators. J Psychosom Res 2010; 69:
241–8.
Buchbinder R, Jolley D. Effects of a media campaign on back beliefs is
sustained 3 years after its cessation. Spine 2005; 30: 1323–30.
Burgess PW, Dumontheil I, Gilbert SJ. The gateway hypothesis of rostral
prefrontal cortex (area 10) function. Trends Cogn Sci 2007; 11: 290–8.
Cojan Y, Waber L, Carruzzo A, Vuilleumier P. Motor inhibition in hys-
terical conversion paralysis. Neuroimage 2009; 47: 1026–37.
Corlett PR, Krystal JH, Taylor JR, Fletcher PC. Why do delusions persist?
Front Hum Neurosci 2009; 3: 12.
Corlett PR, Taylor JR, Wang X-J, Fletcher PC, Krystal JH. Toward a
neurobiology of delusions. Prog Neurobiol 2010; 92: 345–69.
Crimlisk HL, Bhatia K, Cope H, David A, Marsden CD, Ron MA. Slater
revisited: 6 year follow up study of patients with medically unex-
plained motor symptoms. BMJ 1998; 316: 582–6.
Crombez G, Eccleston C, Baeyens F, Eelen P. When somatic information
threatens, catastrophic thinking enhances attentional interference. Pain
1998; 75: 187–98.
Dakin S, Carlin P, Hemsley D. Weak suppression of visual context in
chronic schizophrenia. Curr Biol 2005; 15: 822–4.
Edwards MJ, Bhatia KP, Cordivari C. Immediate response to botulinum
toxin injections in patients with fixed dystonia. Mov Disord 2011; 26:
917–18.
Edwards MJ, Moretto G, Schwingenschuh P, Katschnig P, Bhatia KP,
Haggard P. Abnormal sense of intention preceding voluntary move-
ment in patients with psychogenic tremor. Neuropsychologia 2011;
49: 2791–3.
Fahn S, Williams DT. Psychogenic dystonia. Adv Neurol 1988; 50: 431–55.
Farrer C, Frith CD. Experiencing oneself vs. another person as being the
cause of an action: the neural correlates of the experience of agency.
Neuroimage 2002; 15: 596–603.
Feldman H, Friston KJ. Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy. Front
Hum Neurosci 2010; 4: 215.
Felleman DJ, Van Essen DC. Distributed hierarchical processing in the
primate cerebral cortex. Cereb Cortex 1991; 1: 1–47.
Ferrari R, Obelieniene D, Russell AS, Darlington P, Gervais R, Green P.
Symptom expectation after minor head injury. A comparative study
between Canada and Lithuania. Clin Neurol Neurosurg 2001; 103:
184–90.
Fillingim RB, Fine MA. The effects of internal versus external information
processing on symptom perception in an exercise setting. Health
Psychol 1986; 5: 115–23.
Friston KJ. Hallucinations and perceptual inference. Behav Brain Sci
2005a; 28: 764–6.
Friston K. A theory of cortical responses. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol
Sci 2005b; 360: 815–36.
Friston KJ, Daunizeau J, Kilner J, Kiebel SJ. Action and behavior: a
free-energy formulation. Biol Cybern 2010; 102: 227–60.
Friston K, Kilner J, Harrison L. A free energy principle for the brain. J
Physiol Paris 2006; 100: 70–87.
Garety PA, Freeman D. Cognitive approaches to delusions: a critical
review of theories and evidence. Br J Clin Psychol 1999; 38: 113–54.
Garrido MI, Kilner JM, Stephan KE, Friston KJ. The mismatch negativity:
a review of underlying mechanisms. Clin Neurophysiol 2009; 120:
453–63.
Gupta A, Lang AE. Psychogenic movement disorders. Curr Opin Neurol
2009; 22: 430–6.
Haggard P, Jenner J, Wing A. Coordination of aimed movements in a
case of unilateral cerebellar damage. Neuropsychologia 1994; 32:
827–46.
Halligan PW, Athwal BS, Oakley DA, Frackowiak RS. Imaging hypnotic
paralysis: implications for conversion hysteria. Lancet 2000; 355:
986–7.
Hansell S, Mechanic D. The socialization of introspection and illness be-
havior. In: McHugh S, Vallis TM, editors. Illness behavior: a multidis-
ciplinary model. New York: Plenum Press; 1986. p. 253–60.
Helmholtz H. Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. Vol. 3. (English
Trans: Southall JPC, editor). New York: Dover; 1860/1962.
Hilgard ER. Divided consciousness: Multiple controls in human thought
and action. New York: Wiley; 1977.
Hommel B, Pratt J, Colzato L, Godijn R. Symbolic control of visual at-
tention. Psychol Sci 2001; 12: 360–5.
Horvath T, Friedman J, Meares R. Attention in hysteria: a study of
Janet’s hypothesis by means of habituation and arousal measures.
Am J Psychiatry 1980; 137: 217–20.
Hotopf M, Mayou R, Wadsworth M, Wessely S. Childhood risk factors
for adults with medically unexplained symptoms: results from a na-
tional birth cohort study. Am J Psychiatry 1999; 156: 1796–800.
Ismail K, Lewis G. Multi-symptom illnesses, unexplained illness and
Gulf War Syndrome. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2006; 361:
543–51.
James W. The principles of psychology. Vol. Vol. 1. New York: Henry
Holt; 1890.
Janet P. The major symptoms of hysteria. New York, NY, US: Macmillan
Publishing; 1907.
Jueptner M, Stephan KM, Frith CD, Brooks DJ, Frackowiak RS,
Passingham RE. Anatomy of motor learning. I. Frontal cortex and
attention to action. J Neurophysiol 1997; 77: 1313–24.
Kanaan RA, Craig TK, Wessely SC, David AS. Imaging repressed
memories in motor conversion disorder. Psychosom Med 2007; 69:
202–5.
Kenntner-Mabiala R, Andreatta M, Wieser MJ, Mu¨hlberger A, Pauli P.
Distinct effects of attention and affect on pain perception and soma-
tosensory evoked potentials. Biol Psychol 2008; 78: 114–22.
Kihlstrom JF. Hypnosis: a sesquicentennial essay. Int J Clin Exp Hypn
1992; 40: 301–14.
Kirmayer LJ, Taillefer S. Somatoform disorders. In: Turner SM, Hersen M,
editors. Adult psychopathology and diagnosis. 3rd edn. New York:
Wiley; 1997. p. 333–83.
Knapp M, Prince M. Dementia UK: a report into the prevalence and cost
of dementia. London: Alzheimer’s Society; 2007.
Kolk AM, Hanewald GJFP, Schagen S, Gijsbers van Wijk CMT. A symp-
tom perception approach to common physical symptoms. Soc Sci Med
2003; 57: 2343–54.
Kranick S, Ekanayake V, Martinez V, Ameli R, Hallett M, Voon V.
Psychopathology and psychogenic movement disorders. Mov Disord
2011; 26: 1844–50.
3510 | Brain 2012: 135; 3495–3512 M. J. Edwards et al.
LaBerge D. Spatial extent of attention to letters and words. J Exp Psychol
Hum Percept Perform 1983; 9: 371–9.
Lau HC, Rogers RD, Haggard P, Passingham RE. Attention to intention.
Science 2004; 303: 1208–10.
Levy R, Mushin J. The somatosensory evoked response in patients with
hysterical anaesthesia. J Psychosom Res 1973; 17: 81–4.
Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK. Time of conscious intention
to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The
unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 1983; 106:
623–42.
Lloyd DM, Mason L, Brown RJ, Poliakoff E. Development of a paradigm
for measuring somatic disturbance in clinical populations with medic-
ally unexplained symptoms. J Psychosom Res 2008; 64: 21–4.
Lorenz J, Hauck M, Paur RC, Nakamura Y, Zimmermann R, Bromm B,
et al. Cortical correlates of false expectations during pain intensity
judgments—a possible manifestation of placebo/nocebo cognitions.
Brain Behav Immun 2005; 19: 283–95.
Ludwig AM. Hysteria. A neurobiological theory. Arch Gen Psychiatry
1972; 27: 771–7.
Mailis-Gagnon A, Giannoylis I, Downar J, Kwan CL, Mikulis DJ,
Crawley AP, et al. Altered central somatosensory processing in chronic
pain patients with ‘hysterical’ anesthesia. Neurology 2003; 60:
1501–7.
Mangun GR, Hillyard SA. Modulations of sensory-evoked brain poten-
tials indicate changes in perceptual processing during visual-spatial
priming. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 1991; 17: 1057–74.
Marshall JC, Halligan PW, Fink GR, Wade DT, Frackowiak RS. The func-
tional anatomy of a hysterical paralysis. Cognition 1997; 64: B1–B8.
Martin A, Buech A, Schwenk C, Rief W. Memory bias for health-related
information in somatoform disorders. J Psychosom Res 2007; 63:
663–71.
Maruff P, Velakoulis D. The voluntary control of motor imagery.
Imagined movements in individuals with feigned motor impairment
and conversion disorder. Neuropsychologia 2000; 38: 1251–60.
Melloni L, Schwiedrzik CM, Mu¨ller N, Rodriguez E, Singer W.
Expectations change the signatures and timing of electrophysiological
correlates of perceptual awareness. J Neurosci 2011; 31: 1386–96.
Mumford D. On the computational architecture of the neocortex. II. The
role of cortico-cortical loops. Biol Cybern 1992; 66: 241–51.
Munoz DP, Everling S. Look away: the anti-saccade task and the
voluntary control of eye movement. Nat Rev Neurosci 2004; 5:
218–28.
Nachev P, Rees G, Parton A, Kennard C, Husain M. Volition and conflict
in human medial frontal cortex. Curr Biol 2005; 15: 122–8.
Nijenhuis ER, Spinhoven P, Van Dyck R, Van der Hart O, Vanderlinden J.
The development and psychometric characteristics of the Somatoform
Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ-20). J Nerv Ment Dis 1996; 184:
688–94.
Norman D, Shallice T. Attention to action: willed and automatic control
of behavior. In: Davidson R, Schwartz R, Shapiro D, editors.
Consciousness and self-regulation: advances in research and theory
IV. New York: Plenum Press; 1986. p. 1–14.
Paree´s I, Kassavetis P, Saifee TA, Sadnicka A, Bhatia KP, Fotopoulou A,
et al. ‘Jumping to Conclusions’ bias in functional movement disorders.
J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 2012a; 83: 460–3.
Paree´s I, Saifee TA, Kassavetis P, Kojovic M, Rubio-Agusti I, Rothwell JC,
et al. Believing is perceiving: mismatch between self-report and acti-
graphy in psychogenic tremor. Brain 2012b; 135: 117–23.
Pennebaker JW. The psychology of physical symptoms. New York:
Springer-Verlag; 1982.
Pennebaker JW, Brittingham GL. Environmental and sensory cues affect-
ing the perception of physical symptoms. In: Baum A, Singer J, editors.
Advances in environmental psychology. Vol. 4. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum;
1982. p. 115–36.
Pennebaker JW, Lightner JM. Competition of internal and external infor-
mation in an exercise setting. J Pers Soc Psychol 1980; 39: 165–74.
Pennebaker JW, Skelton JA. Selective monitoring of physical sensations. J
Pers Soc Psy 1981; 41: 213–23.
Posner MI, Nissen MJ, Ogden WC. Attended and unattended processing
modes: the role of set for spatial location. In: Pick HL, Saltzman EJ,
editors. Modes of perceiving and processing information. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum; 1978. p. 137–57.
Reynolds JR. Paralysis and other disorders of motion and sensation de-
pendent on idea. BMJ 1869; i: 483–5.
Robbins JM, Kirmayer LJ. Illness cognition, symptom reporting, and
somatisation in primary care. In: McHugh S, Vallis TM, editors.
Illness behavior: a multidisciplinary model. New York: Plenum Press;
1986. p. 283–302.
Robbins JM, Kirmayer LJ. Cognitive and social factors in somatisation. In:
Kirmayer LJ, Robbins JM, editors. Current concepts of somatisation:
research and clinical perspectives. Washington, DC: American
Psychiatric Press; 1991. p. 107–41.
Roelofs K, de Bruijn ERA, Van Galen GP. Hyperactive action monitoring
during motor-initiation in conversion paralysis: an event-related poten-
tial study. Biol Psychol 2006; 71: 316–25.
Roelofs K, Keijsers GPJ, Hoogduin KAL, Na¨ring GWB, Moene FC.
Childhood abuse in patients with conversion disorder. Am J
Psychiatry 2002; 159: 1908–13.
Roelofs K, van Galen GP, Eling P, Keijsers GPJ, Hoogduin CAL.
Endogenous and exogenous attention in patients with conversion par-
esis. Cogn Neuropsychol 2003; 20: 733–45.
Rusch MD, Morris GL, Allen L, Lathrop L. Psychological treatment of
nonepileptic events. Epilepsy Behav 2001; 2: 277–83.
Schmidt AJ, Wolfs-Takens DJ, Oosterlaan J, van den Hout MA.
Psychological mechanisms in hypochondriasis: attention-induced phys-
ical symptoms without sensory stimulation. Psychother Psychosom
1994; 61: 117–20.
Schnell K, Heekeren K, Daumann J, Schnell T, Schnitker R, Moller-
Hartmann W, et al. Correlation of passivity symptoms and dysfunc-
tional visuomotor action monitoring in psychosis. Brain 2008; 131:
2783–97.
Schrag A, Trimble M, Quinn N, Bhatia K. The syndrome of fixed dys-
tonia: an evaluation of 103 patients. Brain 2004; 127: 2360–72.
Schubert R, Blankenburg F, Lemm S, Villringer A, Curio G. Now you feel
itnow you don’t: ERP correlates of somatosensory awareness.
Psychophysiology 2006; 43: 31–40.
Schwingenschuh P, Katschnig P, Seiler S, Saifee TA, Aguirregomo-
zcorta M, Cordivari C, et al. Moving toward ‘laboratory-supported’
criteria for psychogenic tremor. Mov Disord 2011; 26: 2509–15.
Sharpe D, Faye C. Non-epileptic seizures and child sexual abuse: a critical
review of the literature. Clin Psychol Rev 2006; 26: 1020–1040.
Shergill SS, Bays PM, Frith Chris D, Wolpert DM. Two eyes for an eye:
the neuroscience of force escalation. Science 2003; 301: 187.
Shergill SS, Samson G, Bays PM, Frith Chris D, Wolpert DM. Evidence for
sensory prediction deficits in schizophrenia. Am J Psychiatry 2005;
162: 2384–6.
Slater E. Diagnosis of ‘hysteria’. Br Med J 1965; 1: 1395–9.
Spence SA, Brooks DJ, Hirsch SR, Liddle PF, Meehan J, Grasby PM. A
PET study of voluntary movement in schizophrenic patients experien-
cing passivity phenomena (delusions of alien control). Brain 1997; 120:
1997–2011.
Spence SA, Crimlisk HL, Cope H, Ron MA, Grasby PM. Discrete neuro-
physiological correlates in prefrontal cortex during hysterical and
feigned disorder of movement. Lancet 2000; 355: 1243–4.
Stewart DE. The changing faces of somatization. Psychosomatics 1990;
31: 153–8.
Stone J, Carson A, Duncan R, Coleman R, Roberts R, Warlow C, et al.
Symptoms ‘unexplained by organic disease’ in 1144 new neurology
out-patients: how often does the diagnosis change at follow-up? Brain
2009a; 132: 2878–88.
Stone J, Carson A, Aditya H, Prescott R, Zaubi M, Warlow C, et al.
The role of physical injury in motor and sensory conversion symptoms:
a systematic and narrative review. J Psychosom Res 2009b; 66: 383–90.
Stone J, Warlow C, Sharpe M. Functional weakness: clues to mechanism
from the nature of onset. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 2012a; 83:
67–9.
A Bayesian account of ‘hysteria’ Brain 2012: 135; 3495–3512 | 3511
Stone J, Carson A, Duncan R, Roberts R, Coleman R, Warlow C, et al.
Which neurological diseases are most likely to be associated with
‘symptoms unexplained by organic disease’. J Neurol 2012b; 259:
33–8.
Stone J, Warlow C, Carson A, Sharpe M. Eliot Slater’s myth of the
non-existence of hysteria. J R Soc Med 2005; 98: 547–8.
Stone J, Carson A, Duncan R, Roberts R, Warlow C, Hibberd C, et al.
Who is referred to neurology clinics?—the diagnoses made in 3781
new patients. Clin Neurol Neurosurg 2010a; 112: 747–51.
Stone J, Warlow C, Sharpe M. The symptom of functional weakness: a
controlled study of 107 patients. Brain 2010b; 133: 1537–51.
Stone J, Wojcik W, Durrance D, Carson A, Lewis S, MacKenzie L, et al.
What should we say to patients with symptoms unexplained by dis-
ease? The ‘number needed to offend’. BMJ 2002; 325: 1449–50.
Stone J, Zeman A, Simonotto E, Meyer M, Azuma R, Flett S, et al. FMRI
in patients with motor conversion symptoms and controls with simu-
lated weakness. Psychosom Med 2007; 69: 961–9.
Vassend O. Dimensions of negative affectivity, self-reported somatic
symptoms, and health-related behaviors. Soc Sci Med 1989; 28: 29–36.
Voon V, Gallea C, Hattori N, Bruno M, Ekanayake V, Hallett M. The
involuntary nature of conversion disorder. Neurology 2010a; 74: 223–8.
Voon V, Brezing C, Gallea C, Ameli R, Roelofs K, LaFrance WC, et al.
Emotional stimuli and motor conversion disorder. Brain 2010b; 133:
1526–36.
Vuilleumier P, Chicherio C, Assal F, Schwartz S, Slosman D, Landis T.
Functional neuroanatomical correlates of hysterical sensorimotor loss.
Brain 2001; 124: 1077–90.
Vuilleumier P. Hysterical conversion and brain function. Prog Brain Res
2005; 150: 309–29.
Wegner DM, Giuliano T. Arousal-induced attention to self. J Pers Soc
Psychol 1980; 38: 719–26.
Wessely S, Sharpe M, Hotopf M. Chronic fatigue and its syndromes.
Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998.
Wiech K, Ploner M, Tracey I. Neurocognitive aspects of pain perception.
Trends Cogn Sci 2008; 12: 306–13.
Ziv I, Djaldetti R, Zoldan Y, Avraham M, Melamed E. Diagnosis of ‘non-
organic’ limb paresis by a novel objective motor assessment: the quan-
titative Hoover’s test. J Neurol 1998; 245: 797–802.
3512 | Brain 2012: 135; 3495–3512 M. J. Edwards et al.
